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Abstract— Reputation systems provide a protocol for 
participants to interact based on their past performance. The 
concept of a prediction based meter reputation factor is 
introduced as a number between 0.1 and 1 that is assigned to every 
meter and that varies based on the accuracy of a meter’s 
predictions. A system architecture is presented that allows the 
instantiation of rules for economic interaction between metered 
participants in a power system using reputation factors. This will 
create a system in which individuals are incentivised to provide 
accurate predictions, giving planners more reliable information. It 
also provides a basis for the allocation of rewards for flexibility 
and penalties for inflexibility. Two algorithms to allocate meter 
reputation factors are presented and assessed using a defined 
performance index and metering information from the OpenLV 
project. It is demonstrated that the performance of the meter 
reputation algorithms can be moderated according to system 
requirements.  It is concluded that instantiation of the algorithms 
in such a way that makes persecution of individuals impossible is 
crucial. 
 
Index Terms—Power System Economics, Meter Reading, 
Smart Grid, Smart Metering, Incentive Schemes 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The growth of computerized metering in power systems 
coupled with new digital intermediating platforms brings about 
the possibility to implement new types of incentive schemes. 
The concept of meter reputation factors introduced here creates 
a way to incentivise accurate predictions, to provide a tool for 
incentive scheme designers to assign rewards and penalties, and 
to provide a new source of information for system planners. For 
instance, basing reputations on the quality of individual 
predictions might help reduce the costs resulting from 
intermittent sources, when coupled with a well-designed 
incentive scheme. This would potentially solve a systemic need 
identified by Helm in the UK cost of energy review [1],  the 
allocation of intermittency/inflexibility costs to originators. 
This is accompanied by the potential to allocate associated 
rewards for flexibility.  
The existing literature on reputation systems is commonly 
written with reference to reputation systems for online 
platforms such as, electronic market places (e.g. auction 
websites) [2], electronic communities (e.g. online chat rooms, 
mailing lists) and virtual multiplayer games.  In addition, 
reputation systems for peer‐to‐peer (P2P) systems [3]–[5] for 
grid computing (computer networks in which each computer's 
resources are shared with every other computer in the system) 
[6], [7] and for wireless communication systems (e.g. wireless 
sensor networks [8], [9] , can also be found [10]. Trestian et al 
[11] proposed a reputation based method for deciding which 
communication network a device would connect to based on 
historical reliability. Their results indicated the potential of 
reputation based systems in supporting cooperative decision 
making. In general, the reputation provided by reputation 
systems is a numerical score derived from aggregated record of 
reported past interactions [12]. 
Another relevant strand of literature is related to 
gamification, the application of computer game systems 
(leaderboards, points, etc) to a real-world system to encourage 
a certain behaviour [13], [14]. Other parts of the literature refer 
to “Serious Games” - games which provide feedback to the user 
to help with decision making [15]–[17]. The interaction of 
social network platforms with the energy system has also 
received attention. Pan et al highlighted the risk of network 
congestion caused by herd behaviour derived from social media 
[18], whereas Skopik found that the technology has potential to 
manage network congestion [19]. 
In the power system, the development of reputation system 
is enabled by the growth of smart meters, enabling trustworthy 
usage information to be digitally communicated and stored. 
Typically, the energy import or export is recorded with a half-
hourly granularity for billing purposes. In some cases, such as 
in the UK, energy usage is reported more frequently (~10 
seconds) directly to the user [20]. 
 There is also a trend for network operators to deploy digital 
metering within their networks and between networks. For 
example, in GB the OpenLV project [21] is deploying 
distributed intelligence devices for Low Voltage (LV) 
monitoring, data processing and implementing network charges 
at distribution substations. The system is designed to work in 
real time, without the need for remote observation and decision 
making. It uses substation based computers that are able to 
perform analysis of the LV network and perform control or 
communication actions as a result. This may allow for tasks to 
be performed that would otherwise suffer from data 
communication bottlenecks, for example control based on 
improved local demand predictions.  
 From a security standpoint, there is a question of how 
intermediating platforms should be implemented so that it is not 
possible for individual meters to be targeted (e.g. manual 
editing of individual meter reputation). This is partly a question 
of setting out clear rules for interaction, and partly a question of 
how the rules are instantiated. A promising technology for 
instantiating the rules for interaction in a tamper resistant way 
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are distributed ledger technology based smart contracts [22]. 
Smart contracts are self-enforcing agreements in the form of 
executable programs [23]–[25]. They have potential to allow 
meter reputation rules to be implemented in a tamper resistant 
way.  
The contribution of this paper is in the introduction of the 
concept of prediction based meter reputation factors and in in 
the creation of reputation algorithms that could be used to 
improve the quality of information available to system planners. 
In summary, the paper describes: 
• Definition of two new power system roles to 
facilitate the use of a prediction based reputation 
system 
• A set of desirable characteristics for meter 
reputation factors.  
• Creation of two plausible meter reputation 
algorithms. 
• A set of indices against which the performance of 
reputation factors can be assessed by system 
operators. 
• Assessment of the two algorithms using the 
performance indices. 
• Assessment of the two algorithms with real 
metered data from the OpenLV project. 
II.  THE SYSTEM GOVERNOR AND MECHANISM DESIGNER 
ROLES 
To explain a meter prediction based reputation system, it is 
assumed that the system will operate using a trustworthy digital 
intermediating platform, where an incentive scheme (intended 
to improve individual predictions, for example) is instantiated. 
Two new roles are introduced, system governor and mechanism 
designer (see Fig. 1).  The meters located throughout the 
network send usage readings to the platform and also send 
predictions prior to the time of use. The meters are grouped into 
classes, to allow the system governor to moderate the reputation 
of different user types separately. 
 
 
Figure 1 - Overview of system architecture for introduction of a 
reputation system 
III.  METER REPUTATION ALGORITHMS 
A.  General form 
A general form of meter reputation algorithm was developed 
as described in (1) and (2). 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑚,𝑡 =  𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑚,𝑡−1 × (𝑈 − 𝐷 ×𝑊)         (1)        
 
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑚,𝑡 = {
0.1 ,               𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑚,𝑡 < 0.1 
1.0,               𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑚,𝑡 > 1.0
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑚,𝑡,             𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
  (2) 
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑚,𝑡is the reputation factor output from the algorithm for 
meter m at time t, bounded between 0.1 and 1. 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑚,𝑡 is the 
reputation factor prior to bounds checking. U and D are 
parameters adjustable by the system governor. W is a value 
acting on the meter’s previous predictions and readings, it 
produces weighting factor and contains other parameters 
adjustable by the system governor. Two meter reputation 
algorithms are defined below. They were created by using 
different methods for calculation of W.        
B.  Algorithm 1 
Algorithm 1 calculates 𝑊 as the ratio between the prediction 
error (the difference between the predicted and the actual usage) 
and the meter’s historical peak error (3). To avoid a one-off 
large error permanently distorting the outcome, the peak value 
is gradually forgotten, this is done by reducing the peak value 
at each time step, using a factor 𝑃𝑘, until a new prediction error 
has a higher value (4). This higher prediction error then 
becomes the peak. The 𝑃𝑘 variable allows the system governor 
to modify the performance of the reputation system. It is not 
unique to individual meters. The meter reputation algorithm is 
described in equations (3) to (4).  
 
𝑊 = 
|𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑,𝑚,𝑡− 𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑡,𝑚,𝑡|
𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑚,𝑡
                         (3) 
 
𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑚,𝑡 = {
𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑚,𝑡−1 × 𝑃𝑘, |𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑,𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑡,𝑚,𝑡| < 𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑚,𝑡−1
|𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑,𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑡,𝑚,𝑡|, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
    (4) 
 
Where 𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑,𝑚,𝑡 predicted mean power for meter m at time (e.g. 
half hour number) t. 𝑃𝑘 is a factor, adjustable by the system 
governor, modifying the meter reputation’s sensitivity to its 
stored historical peak. 𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑚,𝑡 is the historical recorded peak 
for meter, m, which reduces over time until a higher value is 
recorded.  
C.  Algorithm 2 
In the second algorithm, W is calculated using the sum of three 
factors representing the quality of the last prediction for time t 
(𝑊1), the quality of all the predictions for time t (𝑊2) and the 
quality of the previous predictions for meter m (𝑊3). The meter 
reputation algorithm is described in (5) to (13).  
 
𝑊 = 𝑊1 +𝑊2 +𝑊3                              (5) 
 
 
𝑊1 = {
𝑘1,
|𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑,𝑚,1,𝑡− 𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑡,𝑚,𝑡|
𝑠𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟,𝑡
> 1
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
                        () 
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 𝑊2 = {
𝑘2,
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑚,𝑡
𝑠𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟,𝑡
> 1
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
                         () 
 
 𝑊3 = {
𝑘3,
𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑚,𝑡
𝑠𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟,𝑡
> 1
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
                         () 
 
Where 𝑘1 + 𝑘2 + 𝑘3 = 1 : 𝑘𝑖 > 0 ∀𝑖 ∈ [1,2,3] and 
𝑠𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 ,𝑡 is the product between the actual meter 
reading and the permissible error factor (9), adjustable by the 
system governor, 𝑃𝑒. 𝑠_𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑚,𝑡 quantifies the quality of the 
predictions for meter 𝑚 at time 𝑡 over its measurement history 
(10). 𝑠_𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑚,𝑡  is a measure of the quality of the predictions 
done for meter 𝑚 for time 𝑡. It is defined as the standard 
deviation of the 𝑛 previous prediction errors (11). 
 
𝑠𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟,𝑡 = 𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑡,𝑚,𝑡  × 𝑃𝑒          (9) 
 
𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑚,𝑡 =
{
 
 
 
 
𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑚,𝑡−1 +
(𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑚,𝑡−1 + 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑚,𝑡)
𝐴
, 𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑚,𝑡−1 < 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑚,𝑡
𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑚,𝑡−1 −
(𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑚,𝑡−1 + 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑚,𝑡)
𝐴
, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
 (10) 
 𝑠_𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑚,𝑡 = √∑
(𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑,𝑚,𝑖,𝑡− 𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑡,𝑚,𝑡)
2
𝑛−1
𝑛
𝑖=1                   
   (11) 
 
Where 𝐴 is an historical weighting factor which influences the 
sensitivity to past errors. 𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑,𝑚,𝑖,𝑡 is the 𝑖th predicted mean 
power for meter 𝑚 at time (half hour number) t, and  𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑡,𝑚,𝑡 is 
the actual mean power for meter 𝑚 at time (half hour number) 
𝑡 and 𝑛 is the number of prior predictions for time t.  
IV.  METER REPUTATION ALGORITHM ASSESSMENT INDEX 
The performance index is a measure of how quickly the 
reputation of an individual meter recovers from a low value to 
a high one on accurate predictions, and how quickly its 
reputation depletes on inaccurate predictions. It has two 
components RI and DI, described in equations (12)-(14): 
 
𝑃𝐼𝑇 = 𝑅𝐼𝑇 − 𝐷𝐼𝑇                     (12) 
 
𝑅𝐼𝑇 =
𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟=0%
𝑇
            (13) 
 
𝐷𝐼𝑇 =
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟=100%
𝑇
          (14) 
 
Considering a reputation factor where 0.1 is the lowest value 
(indicating a history of poor prediction accuracy) and 1 the 
highest (indicating a relatively accurate prediction history), 
𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟=0%is the number of iterations it takes for 
a meter’s reputation to go from 0.1 to 1.0 if the prediction is 
perfect (i.e. the prediction equals the actual reading 0% error). 
Similarly, 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟=100% is the number of 
iterations it takes for a meter’s reputation to go from 1.0 to 0.1 
if the meter’s actual reading is set at 1 p.u, and the predicted 
readings are set at 2 p.u. (i.e. a 100% error). 𝑇 is the time 
window width. 
V.  TESTING OF THE METER REPUTATION ALGORITHMS 
A.  Initialisation values 
The initial parameters of the algorithms were set, using trial 
and error, as shown in Table I and Table II. 
TABLE I.  ALGORITHM 1 INITIAL PARAMETERS 
Parameter Setting 
𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑚,𝑡−1 0 
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑚,𝑡−1 0.5 
𝑈 1.019 
𝐷 0.018 
TABLE II.  ALGORITHM 2 INITIAL PARAMETERS 
Parameter Setting 
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑚,𝑡−1 0.5 
𝑘1 0.5 
𝑘2 0.25 
𝑘3 0.25 
𝐴 48 
𝑆_𝑎𝑣𝑔 0 
𝑈 1.015 
𝐷 0.0307 
B.  Performance Index (PI) with varied parameters 
The PI of each of the algorithms was calculated. These are 
shown in Table III and IV. Note that positive infinite PI means 
that the reputation factor will never recover or would need 
perfect prediction (zero prediction error) to recover. A negative 
infinite PI means that the reputation factor will never deplete. 
The highlighted values were used to test the operation of 
algorithms using real data from the OpenLV project.  
TABLE III.  ALGORITHM 1 PI2929 WITH VARIED INPUT PARAMETERS 
U PI D PI Pk PI 
1.006 0.071 0.020 -0.411 0.100 0.032 
1.0077 0.033 0.024 -0.084 0.171 0.023 
1.0094 0.003 0.029 -0.031 0.243 0.013 
1.0111 -0.028 0.033 -0.010 0.314 -0.001 
1.0129 -0.067 0.037 0.001 0.386 -0.019 
1.0146 -0.124 0.041 0.009 0.457 -0.043 
1.0163 -0.242 0.046 0.014 0.529 -0.076 
1.018 -0.741 0.050 0.018 0.600 -0.128 
TABLE IV.  ALGORITHM 2 PI2929 WITH VARIED INPUT PARAMETERS 
U PI D PI Pe PI 
1.01 0.0403 0.01 -inf 0 inf 
1.0121 0.0222 0.0121 -inf 0.0429 -0.0003 
1.0143 0.0065 0.0143 -inf 0.0857 -0.0006 
1.0164 -0.0078 0.0164 -0.7941 0.1286 -0.0013 
1.0186 -0.0239 0.0186 -0.2007 0.1714 -0.0017 
1.0207 -0.042 0.0207 -0.0996 0.2143 -0.002 
1.0229 -0.0686 0.0229 -0.0549 0.2571 -0.0023 
1.025 -0.1086 0.025 -0.0317 0.3 -0.0027 
 
C.  Case study – 11:0.433kV Substation Data 
Data collected during the OpenLV project was used to assess 
the performance of the algorithms. The data originates from the 
metering at an 11:0.433 kV substation in Cardiff. The 
prediction data was generated using a moving average model 
based on the data from the two preceding days. The algorithm’s 
parameters were varied as highlighted in Tables III and IV. Fig. 
2 and Fig. 3 show the resultant reputation factors overlaid on 
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the prediction error information obtained from the OpenLV 
project. The default values are the values used unless specified 
otherwise. 
A number of observations can be made from the results. For 
algorithm 1, a greater value of D implies that a meter’s 
reputation is more likely to fall for a given prediction error. 
Conversely, a smaller U or Peak factor implies that a meter’s 
reputation is more likely to fall for a given prediction error. For 
algorithm 2, a greater value of D again implies that a meter’s 
reputation is more likely to fall for a given prediction error. A 
smaller U or permissible error implies that a meter’s reputation 
is more likely to fall for a given prediction error.  Finally, the 
PI values calculated in Table provide an indicator of how the 
reputation algorithm will behave when applied to the real data. 
In all of the test cases, the lower the value of PI is, the more 
likely the reputation algorithm is to rise rather than fall. 
VI.  DISCUSSION 
The results presented in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 show that both the 
proposed algorithms give the system governor means to vary 
the sensitivity of a meter’s reputation to its prediction error. 
This gives the system governor the ability to moderate the meter 
reputations upwards or downwards, by adjusting the U 
parameter, for instance. This creates a new control tool to 
manage the stability of the system through influencing the 
quality of prediction information from the system’s meters. 
Furthermore, the mechanism designer can create a set of rules 
in which the system governor would be able to modulate how 
much meters are rewarded for providing accurate predictions. 
The system governor can then make parameter adjustments to 
improve the prediction information from the system’s meters, 
according to its requirements.  
If this system were instantiated as part of a smart contract 
based system, it could be implemented in a way such that the 
governor could only moderate reputations (e.g. the U or D 
parameters) for whole classes of meter (e.g. LV single phase 
meters, or 11kV inter-network meters). If the meter classes are 
chosen carefully, this would remove the possibility for targeting 
of individual meter reputations through malign or accidental 
adjustment.  Furthermore, mechanism designers would have the 
option to use reputation factor as a reward modifier. For 
example, payments could be taken from those tending to 
imbalance the system, and transferred to those tending to 
balance it, with the imbalance-balance direction determined 
during the settlement period. In this way a system wide focal 
point could be created around the demand supply balance, with 
the potential for gaming the system reduced through means of 
the meter reputations. This is the subject of ongoing research 
[26]. 
VII.  CONCLUSIONS 
Through presentation and demonstration of two algorithms, 
this research shows that the application of reputation factors to 
meters, based on their individual predictions and actual 
readings is feasible. A performance index was defined and 
shown to be a rough indicator of how a meter’s reputation 
recovers (with accurate predictions) and depletes (with poor 
predictions) over a defined period. The presented algorithms 
give negotiation and settlement mechanism designers a means 
to stimulate the creation of economic focal points in demand 
supply balance. However, the instantiation of such algorithms 
in such a way that makes persecution of individuals impossible 
is crucial. 
 
Figure 2 - Reputation with algorithm 1, varied input parameters. Default values: U=1.0194, D=0.018, Peak factor=0.9 
 
Figure 3 - Reputation with algorithm 2, varied input parameters. Default values: U=1.0155, D=0.0307, Permissible error=0.15 
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